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Political Selection of Firms into Privatization Programs   
Evidence from Romanian Comprehensive Data 
ÁDÁM SZENTPÉTERI – ÁLMOS TELEGDY 
Abstract 
Exploiting a unique institutional feature of the early Romanian privatization setup, when a 
group of firms was explicitly barred from any privatization, we test how politicians select 
firms into privatization programs.  Using a comprehensive dataset that includes all firms 
inherited from socialism, we estimate the relation between pre-privatization firm 
characteristics (the information known to politicians at the time of decision making) and the 
effect of privatization on employment, efficiency and wages.  We argue that other objectives, 
such as revenue maximization or bribe collection were of secondary importance in the early 
Romanian privatization. Using the estimated coefficients, we simulate the effect of 
privatization on non-privatizable and privatizable firms, including in the latter group both 
privatized and not privatized enterprises.  The simulations show that politicians expected the 
reduction of employment by 5.2 percent of the non-privatizable group, as a consequence of 
privatization.  Contrary to this expectation, employment in the privatizable group was likely 
to grow by the same proportion.  We do not find such discrepancies in the expected change in 
firm efficiency, as the simulated efficiency effect of privatization is large and positive for both 
groups of firms, and it is around 40 percent.  The analysis does not support the hypothesis 
that wages played an important role in privatization decisions.  These results do not change 
qualitatively if the privatizable group is disaggregated into privatized and not privatized 
groups.  Our study suggests that employment concerns played the key role in selecting firms 
for privatization, even if efficiency gains had to be sacrificed. 
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Vállalatok politikai szelekciója privatizációs 
programokba Romániában 
 




A romániai privatizáció kezdete előtt egy vállalatcsoportot a kormány törvényileg eltiltott a 
privatizációtól.  Tanulmányunkban ezt használjuk fel arra, hogy elemezzük a privatizációs 
döntések mozgatórugóit:  hatékonyságnövelés, a dolgozói létszám fenntartása vagy a bérek 
szinten tartása volt-e a a célja a politikai döntéshozóknak?  Felhasználva a végbement 
privatizációk hatásait a vállalati magatartásra, szimuláljuk a privatizációs hatásokat mind a 
nem privatizálható, mind a privatizálható vállalatok esetében a vállalatok magánosítás előtti 
változóinak függvényében, amely információ birtokában voltak a politikusok akkor, amikor 
döntéseiket hozták a vállalatok privatizálhatóságáról.  Eredményeink azt mutatják, hogy a 
politikusok legfőbb célja a vállalatok dolgozói létszmának fenntartása volt még akkor is, ha 
ezt csak a termelékenységnövekedés rovására érhették el.  Elemzésünk szerint bérhatások 
nem játszottak szerepet a vállalatok privatizációs programokba való kiválasztásában.   
Következetésink akkor is fennálnak, ha a privatizálható vállalatok csoportját privatizált és 
nem privatizált vállalatokra bonjuk fel, és ezeket hasonlítjuk össze a nem privatizálható 
vállalatokkal. 
 
Tárgyszavak: privatizáció, politikai célok, vállalati viselkedés, Románia 
 





The effects of privatization on firm behavior have stimulated a large amount of research 
(Megginson and Netter; 2001; Djankov and Murrell, 2002), but the selection of state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) into privatization programs, which is the precondition of privatization, 
has received much less attention.  Nevertheless, in the recent years there have been a small, 
but growing number of studies focusing on the motivations of politicians and bureaucrats 
materialized in decisions about allowing or banning firms to become private.1  This paper 
contributes to this literature by analyzing Romanian firm-level data to asses the relative 
importance of three factors that most likely played a crucial role in selecting firms into 
privatization programs:  efficiency enhancement of the old socialist production sector and 
two factors directly influencing workers’ well being, employment and wages.  A peculiar 
institutional feature of the Romanian privatization program permits us to distinguish 
between SOEs that were slated to or banned from becoming private.  In 1990, in advance of 
launching any privatization program, the Romanian government selected about 370 SOEs 
and prohibited their transfer to private owners; this ban was lifted more than seven years 
later, after the left-wing party governing between 1990 and 1996 lost the elections.2  This 
feature permits the identification of firms that the government slated for privatization even if 
they were not actually privatized.  Indeed, our data reveal how important the ex-ante 
separation of privatizable and non-privatizable companies is: only one-quarter of the 
privatizable group was actually privatized by the end of the political cycle we study.3 
A possible shortcoming of the analysis is that it focuses on only three objectives, while 
others, such as revenue maximizing, reputation concerns or bribe collection might also have 
played a role in privatization decisions.  The potential importance of these factors 
notwithstanding, we argue that the design of the early Romanian privatization program was 
such that they were of secondary importance, as we discuss below.  The institutional setting 
of early Romanian privatization therefore helps us to assess the importance of expected effect 
of privatization on firm efficiency, employment and wages in the objectives of politicians, and 
the results are not contaminated to a large extent by the exclusion of other objectives, which 
we cannot measure. 
                                                        
1 Bortolotti et al. (2003) provide a cross-country analysis of the factors that influence the privatization decision.  
Gupta et al. (2008) test sequencing empirically on Czech data.  Guo and Yao (2005), De Fraja and Roberts (2008), 
Dinc and Gupta (2005) and Liu and Woo (2007) analyze which factors influenced the selection of firms into 
privatization programs in China, Poland and India. 
2 During this period the government changed several times, but the leading party and its symbolic figure, 
President Iliescu, was in office throughout the whole period. 
3 We have to set the time span over which governments were interested in the effects of privatization.  
The political cycle is a natural choice for this time period: as governments are interested in reelection, 
they arguably want to maximize public welfare around the time of elections.  
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To assess politicians’ objectives, we propose an alternative method to those papers that 
have analyzed this question with microeconomic data (De Fraja and Roberts, 2008; Dinc and 
Gupta, 2007; Guo and Yao, 2005; Gupta et al, 2008; Liu and Woo, 2007).  Instead of 
estimating the effects of pre-privatization characteristics on the probability of being selected 
into the privatizable group (or on sequencing of privatization), we use information on the 
effect of actual privatizations on firm behavior and simulate the relationship between pre-
privatization firm characteristics and the effect of privatization on both privatizable and non-
privatizable firms.  First we estimate the relation between the effect of privatization on 
employment, firm efficiency and wages and the firm’s pre-privatization characteristics – the 
information known to politicians when they decided which firm could be transferred in 
private ownership.  Then we use the estimated partial effects to simulate the employment, 
efficiency and wage effects of privatization for the privatizable and non-privatizable firms 
separately (including in the first group both privatized and not yet privatized firms).  The 
comparison of the simulated effects for the two groups of firms indicates that those firms 
which were expected to shed employment as a consequence of privatization were sheltered 
from privatization programs even though their expected efficiency increase was large.  The 
simulated wage effects are very small and similar for the two groups, suggesting that wage 
effects of privatization were of secondary importance. 
We believe that this method has several advantages over the ones used in earlier research, 
but it also has drawbacks.  Its main benefit is that we do not have to make conjectures about 
the relation between pre-privatization characteristics and the effects of privatization, as we 
estimate these relations directly from the data.  In addition, we mutually simulate the effects 
of privatization on several variables of interest, which permits us to assess the relative 
importance of decision makers’ objectives, if privatization had conflicting effects.  For 
example, we can infer what decision politicians made when privatization was likely to bring 
a b o u t  b o t h  a n  e m p l o y m e n t  r e d u c t i o n  a n d  a n  e f f i c i e n c y  i n c r e a s e  –  a s  i t  h a p p e n s  i n  t h e  
Romanian case. 
The method’s main disadvantage is that it hinges on the assumption that the effect of 
privatization has the same pattern across privatizable and non-privatizable firms, a common 
a s s u m p t i o n  i n  s i m u l a t i o n  e x e r c i s e s .   A l t h o u g h  w e  c o n t r o l  f o r  m a n y  p r e - p r i v a t i z a t i o n  
characteristics and their interactions in the first-stage regressions, we still cannot be sure 
that this assumption holds.  We also have to assume that politicians have rational 
expectations and foresee what would happen to SOEs conditional on their pre-privatization 
characteristics after privatization.  These deficiencies notwithstanding, we believe that this 
method is a useful complement to those used so far. 
Besides the new method, another difference between this paper and the ones written so 
far is the economic environment in which privatizations took place.  The four countries  
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studied so far – China, the Czech Republic, India and Poland – did not have massive 
employment declines when privatization decisions were made.  Romania differs from these 
countries as employment fell by about ten percent between 1992 and 1996, the period of 
interest of this paper (Romanian Statistical Yearbook, 1997).4  It is likely that politicians faced 
different constraints in such economic environment than in countries which did not 
experience large employment reductions. 
In the next section we discuss politicians’ objectives in privatization programs and their 
relevance in the Romanian context.  Section 3 presents the data and the institutional setting 
of the early Romanian privatization. The simulation method is discussed in Section 4, 
followed by the results in Section 5.  The last section concludes. 
 
2. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN PRIVATIZATION PROGRAMS 
How do politicians choose which firms to privatize?  While economists have frequently 
recommended privatization as a tool for firm restructuring and depolitization, the designers 
of privatization programs act in response to a much broader set of political objectives and 
face a number of constraints. 
An expected advantage of privatization is the efficiency improvement of SOEs, which has 
been modeled by many (e.g., Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Schmidt, 1996) and tested 
empirically (e.g., Megginson et al, 1994; Brown et al, 2006).  This effect may come about 
through several channels, such as hardening budget constraints and the direct interest of the 
new owners in profits (Boycko et al, 1996; Bartel and Harrison, 2005).  Politicians may assess 
positively the efficiency improvement of firms for several reasons.  First and perhaps most 
important, only efficient firms are viable, especially if privatization is accompanied by 
deregulation of markets and therefore an increase in competitive pressure on firms (as 
happened in many developed countries, and also in the early years of transition).  Second, 
efficiency improvement may result in increased revenues for the state budget through 
increased corporate taxes, or sales taxes if the firm grows and increases the value of sales.  
Hard budget constraints also decrease the burden on state’s budget.  The increased revenues 
are useful for politicians as they can be used to pursue social or political objectives (Kay and 
Thompson, 1986).  These may include tax reductions, support of the welfare system, or 
investments in infrastructure, all having a positive effect on chances of reelection. 
Employment and wages, two variables that have a direct effect on voter well-being, may 
also be choice variables for politicians, either for equity reasons or vote maximization (as 
these two are observationally equivalent, we do not distinguish between them).  If 
                                                        
4 Gupta et al. (2008) also make this point.  
8 
 
privatization results in layoffs and declining real wages, it will have a negative effect on 
worker welfare (at least in the short run) and also on the number of votes that can be 
collected by the governing parties in the following election.  While empirical studies are not 
conclusive about the employment and wage effects of privatization (e.g., Bhaskar and Khan, 
1995; Brown et al., 2005; Megginson et al., 1994), theoretical papers suggest that 
employment and wages are likely to fall after privatization (Boycko et al., 1996; Haskel and 
S z y m a n s k i ,  1 9 9 3 ) .   I n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  h o w e v e r ,  w e  a r e  n o t  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  a c t u a l  e f f e c t  o f  
privatization on employment and wages, but on the perceptions of politicians, who were also 
likely to have reservations about these effects.  Megginson (2005), for example, notes that “all 
governments fear lay-offs resulting privatization” (p. 389).  The reluctance to privatize firms 
w i t h  h i g h  c h a n c e s  o f  e m p l o y m e n t  o r  w a g e  d e c l i n e s  c a n  b e  e x a c e r b a t e d  b y  i n c u m b e n t  
employees’ reactions, who may resist privatization if they fear losing their job (Druk Gal and 
Yaari, 2006).  This fear need not be realistic – it is enough if workers expect this to be the 
result of privatization (Lipton and Sachs, 1990) .   I f  t h e  e c o n o m y  i s  i n  r e c e s s i o n  –  a s  i t  
happened in Romania – the political cost of employment reduction may be even stronger.  
Ceteris paribus, the reduction of employment or the wage bill also has a negative effect on 
state finances, because of lower income and payroll tax revenues and higher unemployment 
benefit bill. 
In addition, politicians benefit from revenues resulting from the sale of enterprises, 
another income for the state budget (Bortolotti et al, 2003).  They may also use firms to 
bestow political patronage (López-de-Silanes et al, 1997).  Instead of maximizing the state 
budget, they may also maximize their own wealth by collecting bribes (Shleifer, 1998).   
Reputation concerns and the need to make privatization attractive to investors and the 
population might also play a role in banning s o m e  f i r m s  f r o m  b e c o m i n g  p r i v a t e :   i f  t h e  
government predicts that some firms cannot be privatized, it might be a good strategy to 
explicitly forbid their transfer to private hands (e.g., Gupta et al, 2008; Villalonga, 2000). 
In this paper we focus only on efficiency, employment and wage considerations of 
politicians.  In the Romanian context, however, the limited number of objectives does not 
seem to us to be a large drawback.  First, these objectives are surely among the most 
important that induced governments to privatize or keep firms in state ownership not only in 
Romania but all over the world, although other factors discussed above also play a role in 
privatization decisions.  It is possible that these also played a role in the Romanian case, but 
we argue that they were of secondary importance in the early privatization process and not 
including them may bias the results only to a small extent.  An overwhelming majority of the 
privatizations completed between 1992 and 1996 were management-employee buyouts 
(MEBOs), which did not bring revenues to the government.  The shares of the SOEs were sold 
to their employees at highly subsidized prices, usually involving a loan from a state-owned  
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bank at negative interest rates (Earle and Telegdy, 2002).  Bribes might have played a role, 
as investors could make side payments for lower share prices, and the management of the 
company might also have paid politicians not to let the company be sold to outside investors, 
in which case the management would have faced the threat of being replaced by the new 
owners.  Direct sales, however, were so rare in the early 90’s that it is likely that such bribes 
were not common: our data show that out of the over six thousand enterprises inherited from 
the socialist period, only 128 were sold to domestic, and eight to foreign investors by the end 
of the period we study.5  It is also unlikely that reputation concerns played an important role 
in the Romanian case, as only about 30 percent of the firms that were offered in 1992, ended 
up in private hands by 1996, the end of the first political cycle.  Since our data do not measure 
privatization prices or bribes, we could not take these effects into account.  To test reputation 
concerns, information on the privatization price is also necessary as both the quality of the 
company and the price asked for it determine the likeliness of privatization.  The fact that 
factors that we cannot measure – revenue considerations, bribes and reputation concerns – 
are unlikely to have played an important role during the period we study, makes it less likely 
that our estimates are contaminated with omitted variable bias. 
 
3. DATA AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
3.1 DATA CONSTRUCTION 
In this paper we use data from two years, 1992 and 1996.  1992 is the first year with firm level 
data and privatization barely started in this year, as we discuss in Section 3.2.  1996 is the end 
of the first political cycle, and it is thus a natural choice for the end of the period we study.  
We distinguish privatizable and non-privatizable firms by their legal form, as the non-
privatizable SOEs were assigned a special legal form (called Regii Autonome in Romanian). 
Our data come from several sources.  The value of sales, employment, wage bill, industry 
and legal form of firms were drawn from the Romanian Enterprise Registry, a comprehensive 
database of all Romanian enterprises.  We drew net income and the value of tangible assets 
from the Ministry of Finance dataset, which provides preceding year information for 1992 
from the 1993 file for most of the firms inherited from the communist regime, and for all 
Romanian enterprises for 1996.  We also used this dataset to clean the variables.  Cleaning 
procedures involved comparing information from the different sources for employment and 
sales and removing spurious changes in the industry code and legal form.  Sales and net 
income were deflated by two-digit implicit deflators to reflect the price changes faced by 
firms, while wages by the consumer price index to filter out price changes affecting workers’ 
                                                        
5 Out of these only 13 domestic and one foreign privatization were included in our sample.  
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welfare.  As with any large panel data, these also suffer from spurious entry and exit of 
firms, as well as reregistrations without firm boundary changes (in which case the firm 
appears in the data as a new entity).  We improved the longitudinal links by looking for 
possible connections for each entering and exiting firm with at least 50 employees.  For this 
procedure, we used firm name, industry, region and size.  Many of the firms, however, were 
reorganized during the four years we study, which resulted in split-ups and other boundary 
changes.  We are not able to follow these firms across time and therefore we cannot include 
them in this analysis. 
The main source of ownership information is the State Ownership Fund (SOF) 
Transactions Database, which has information on the year of transaction, percent transferred 
and type of buyer for each privatization transaction of about 6,000 SOEs for the period of 
1992-1996.  Some of these firms were inherited directly from the socialist period and others 
were created by using the assets of these firms.  Those firms from the SOF portfolio that had 
no privatization transactions were identified with the help of another database, which 
contains the ownership structure of the firms in 1996.  For those firms which were not part of 
the SOF portfolio, we used the ownership information from the Romanian Enterprise 
Registry data, which indicates whether the firm was 100 percent state-owned, a majority or 
minority of its shares were private or it was totally private.  Using all this information on the 
ownership structure of the firms, we constructed a dummy variable for each year indicating 
whether the firm was majority private or majority state-owned. 
From the resulting dataset we selected those firms which existed in both 1992 and 1996 
and had any indication of state ownership (either existed in the SOF portfolio or the 
ownership dummy from the Romanian Enterprise Registry indicated state ownership).  In 
order to compare privatizable and non-privatizable firms which are as similar as possible, we 
kept in the analysis only those 2-digit industries by the NACE classification which contain at 
least one non-privatizable and one privatized firm.6  We also dropped those firms with 
employment less than ten and more than 36,000, as the non-privatizable set does not have 
firms smaller than 10 and the largest employment size of the privatizable firms is 35,655.  
This procedure resulted in the deletion of 123 and 2 observations, respectively.  We also 
removed those firms for which the data indicated that their labor productivity or wages 
increased (decreased) 10 times between 92 and 96 (45 observations).  T h e  f i n a l  d a t a s e t  
contains 2,797 firms.7 
 
                                                        
6 The NACE codes of these industries are 22, 24, 36, 40, 41, 45, 51, 52, 55, 60, 63, 64, 70, 73, 74, 90, and 92.  
Agriculture contained 5 non-privatizable firms, but their share in the industry did not reach 0.05 percent, and we 
did not include this industry in the analysis. 
7 We perform robustness checks when we replace labor productivity with return on assets (net income over the 
value of tangible assets).  In this case the sample size is 2,311.  We also check whether our results are sensitive to 
the sample construction.  
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3.2 SELECTION OF FIRMS INTO THE PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM 
Similarly to other countries from the region, the reorganization of SOEs in Romania started 
with corporatization.  Already in 1991, before launching any privatization program, about 
8,300 SOEs were reorganized as joint-stock companies; the shares of about 6,000 were 
transferred in a 70-30 percent ratio to the portfolios of the organizations that were 
responsible for their privatization: the State Ownership Fund (SOF) and one of the five 
Private Ownership Funds.8  The other 2,300 firms remained under the supervision of branch 
ministries.  These firms were mostly small (in our data their median employment size is only 
22 in 1992), but some large firms were also left in this group.  The privatization of the firms 
in the second group started quite early and many of them became private.  We do not include 
them in a separate category, but group them together with the firms in the SOF portfolio and 
consider them all privatizable (but we check whether our results change if we exclude them 
from the analysis). 
A number of companies were not corporatized, and transfer of their ownership to private 
owners was explicitly prohibited.  These firms, called Regii Autonome, remained under the 
supervision of the relevant branch ministries.  The declared criteria upon which firms were 
selected into the non-privatizable group are rather vague: according to Law 15 on State 
Enterprise Reorganization (1990), “(Regii Autonome) are organized and operate within the 
economy's strategic branches…as well as in other fields of activity established by the 
Government” (Art 2).  The law did not specify what “other reasons” might be, therefore it 
gave discretion to politicians and state bureaucrats to decide which firms to render 
privatizable and which not.  This is crucial for our analysis, as we draw conclusions about 
politicians’ objectives by comparing the Regii with the privatizable enterprises. 
The non-privatizable group was not numerous, but companies included were large on 
average.  In 1992, in the comprehensive data there are 365 firms whose average employment 
size was over 3,000.  The number of employees working in these firms was over one million, 
which makes up 20 percent of total SOE employment. 
As discussed in the previous section, there were many reorganizations taking place 
between 1992 and 1996, and many of the firms – among them non-privatizable – exit the 
data.  In our sample there are 169 non-privatizable and 2,628 privatizable firms, as Table 1 
s h o w s .   N o n - p r i v a t i z a b l e  f i r m s  w e r e  i n d e e d  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  b r a n c h e s  t h a t  a r e  o f t e n  
                                                        
8 The Private Ownership Funds were founded by the government and they were responsible for transferring the 
shares of the companies from their portfolio directly to the population in a voucher privatization program, but in 
practice they were quite passive until 1995-1996, when the voucher privatization program was launched.  During 
the period covered in this study they did not have any real decision making power with regard to the companies in 
their portfolios, as the SOF possessed in each company 70 percent of the shares.  For this reason, when we 
constructed the ownership variables, we considered the POF shares as state owned.  For a discussion of the POFs, 




considered “strategic” – energy and water distribution, transportation, and utilities – but 
they were also in other sectors of the economy, such as in manufacturing, construction and 
services.  Industry itself does not explain the selection of firms into privatizable and non- 
privatizable groups, as in each of these industries there are also a number of privatizable 
firms. 
In 1992, the first year in the data, the average employment size of the non-privatizable 
firms from our sample is 1,402, while that of privatizable firms 457.  The mean difference is 
significant at the one-percent level.  Measured by labor productivity (defined as the ratio of 
value of sales to average employment), privatizable firms were about twice as productive, but 
the mean difference is significant only at the ten-percent level.  Average wages (the firm’s 
total wage bill divided by the number of employees) were very similar in the two groups of 
firms.  Return on assets (the ratio between net income and the value of assets) is 1.7 percent 
for non-privatizable and 4.7 percent for the privatizable group on average (the mean 
difference being highly significant).  The unconditional mean comparison of pre-privatization 
performance and employment size suggests that pre-privatization employment and efficiency 
played a role in the selection of firms into privatization, while wages did not.  It is also 
important for the analysis that despite the large differences in the mean values of 
employment and firm performance variables, the distributions of employment and 
productivity overlap across the two groups of firms.9 
To take the effect of all variables into account at the same time, we estimate a probit 
specification similar to those used in other studies (De Fraja and Roberts 2008; Gupta et al, 
2008; Liu et al, 2007).  The dependent variable indicates whether the firm is privatizable or 
not, and the regressors are firm characteristics in 1992 (employment, labor productivity, 
wage and industry dummies).  Table 2 shows that employment size had a negative effect on 
the probability of being in the privatizable group:  the coefficient is -0.014 and highly 
significant.  This means that the firm at the 10th percentile of the employment distribution 
has a 1.6 percent chance to be in the non-privatizable group, while this is 5.9 percent of the 
firm situated at the 90th percentile (the other variables are set at their mean level).  More 
productive firms, on the other hand, had a higher chance of becoming privatizable, and the 
effect is similar in magnitude to that of employment.  The firm which occupies the 10th 
percentile in the pre-privatization efficiency distribution has a chance 4.5 percent to be non-
privatizable group; this proportion is only two percent for the firm situated at the 90th 
percentile.  Wages do not seem to have played a role in the selection of firms into 
privatization, as the estimated coefficient is small and insignificant.  Controlling for size, 
                                                        
9 The 75th percentile of the employment distribution of privatizable firms is larger than the employment size of the 
median non-privatizable firm, and the 25th percentile of the non-privatizable employment distribution is smaller 




efficiency and the wage level, construction and service firms had a higher chance of being 
privatizable than industrial firms, despite the fact that the latter group includes energy 
production and water distribution, two industries classified as of strategic importance.10  The 
probit regression shows, therefore that relatively small and productive firms are more likely 
to be selected into the Romanian privatization program.  The efficiency result is similar to the 
f i n d i n g  o f  D i n c  a n d  G u p t a  ( 2 0 0 7 ) ,  b u t  t h e y  f i n d  t h a t  l a r g e r  f i r m s  a r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  
privatized in India.  The result that wages are not a determinant of the selection of firms into 
privatization is also at odds with Dinc and Gupta (2007) and Liu et al. (2007). 
The privatization process started quite lat e  i n  R o m a n i a .   A l t h o u g h  t h e  L a w  o f  
Privatization was passed in mid-1991, privatization of enterprises gained speed only in 1993-
94.  In our sample only 12 firms were privatized by the end of 1992, the first year studied, 
which shows that the data from the first year of the analysis is contaminated by privatization 
effects to a very small extent.11  The overwhelming majority of privatizations by 1996 were 
MEBOs.  In the sample used in this study over 90 percent of the firms were sold by this 
method.  We consider a firm as being privatized by 1996 if it became majority private in 1995 
or before, to permit privatization to take its effect on firm behavior.  By this criterion, 683 
firms from the sample were privatized, which makes up 26 percent of the privatizable firms. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL METHOD 
We use information on privatization outcomes to simulate the effect of privatization on the 
privatizable and non-privatizable firms separately.  First we establish the relation between 
the effect of privatization and the 1992 characteristics of the firms – the information known 
t o  p o l i c y  m a k e r s  w h e n  d e c i d i n g  w h i c h  f i r m  to become privatizable and which not.  The 
identifying assumption is that the decision makers used only observable pre-privatization 
characteristics of SOEs to infer the effects of privatization on firm behavior.  This seems to us 
a realistic assumption: given the large number of firms to decide about, it is unlikely that 
decision makers had more information on firms than what was shown in firms’ books.  In 
accordance with this assumption, we estimate the first step regressio n  b y  o r d i n a r y  l e a s t  
squares (OLS), which, unlike a fixed effect regression, does not take out the effect of 
unobservable firm characteristics.  The OLS also has the advantage that we can estimate the 
effect of privatization on the change of political objectives between the first and last year of 
the political cycle, as it is likely that politicians want to maximize voter well-being around the 
                                                        
10 We also ran this specification replacing labor productivity with ROA, and the results are qualitatively similar. 
11 If the managers of the SOEs foresaw privatization, there may be a pre-privatization effect already in 1992 which 
may bias the results (Aghion et al., 1994; Roland and Sekkat, 2000).  
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time of the elections.12  Having obtained the estimated effects of the pre-privatization firm-
level variables on post-privatization outcomes, we construct the counterfactual of the effect of 
privatization for each firm by multiplying pre-privatization characteristics with the estimated 
effects, and compare the average hypothetical privatization effect between non-privatizable 
and privatizable firms (including in the latter group both the privatized and the not privatized 
ones). 
The estimating equation used to obtain the effect of privatization as a function of pre-
privatization firm characteristics is the following: 
Δy92-96,i = β0 + β1X92,i + β2POi X92,i + εi,           (1) 
where i indexes the firms, Δy92-96 is the change between 1992 and 1996 of the variable of 
interest, which is log employment, efficiency (measured as labor productivity or return on 
assets) and average wage.  PO = 1 if the firm was majority privatized by the end of 1995, and 
zero otherwise, X92,i is a vector of the firm i’s 1992 characteristics and εi is the residual.  In 
particular, X92 includes log employment, efficiency, average wage and industrial dummies.  In 
order to have enough non-privatizable and privatized firms in each industry for estimation, 
we define four dummies:  industry, construction, transportation and other services.  The 
omitted category is industry, and we include interactions between PO and all four industrial 
dummies (and do not include PO alone).  In order to allow a more flexible functional form 
between pre-privatization firm characteristics and the effect of privatization, we also include 
in X92 interactions between pre-privatization employment-efficiency, wage-efficiency, as well 
as interactions between employment, efficiency and wages with all four industrial dummies 
(and do not include them interacting with PO alone).  As a robustness check, we also include 
squared terms of log employment, efficiency and wage. 
Using the estimated parameters from (1), we compute the simulated effect of 
privatization between 1992 and 1996 for each firm separately: 
 
                (2) 
With the help of (2), we construct the average difference between non-privatizable and 
privatizable firms (the privatizable group including both privatized and not yet privatized 
companies): 
2 ˆˆ ˆ
NPRIV PRIV yy y Δ= Δ − Δ .     (3) 
This statistic shows the difference in the hypothetical effects of privatization between the 
two groups, and we use it to assess the motivations of decision makers.  This method permits 
                                                        
12 Fixed effects regression would provide estimates either of the average growth of the dependent variable over the 
years when the firm was already private (if the dependent variable is defined in levels) or the change in its growth 
rate (if it is defined as growth). 
i i X y , 92 2 ˆ ˆ β = Δ 
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us to analyze jointly the employment, efficiency and wage effects of privatization, which in 
turn allows us to draw conclusions on the relative importance of these variables in politicians’ 
objectives.  If, for example, 
2 0 emp Δ< and 
2 0 eff Δ > , this would imply that politicians were 
more concerned about the employment effects of privatization than about efficiency gains, as 
they did not allow the privatization of firms that were expected to suffer declining 
employment levels after the ownership change, even if these firms would have gained 
efficiency as a consequence of privatization. 
 
5. RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients of the first-step results.  To start with the 
employment growth equation, the table shows that ceteris paribus, interactions between 
privatization and industrial dummies have negative estimated coefficients in all industries.  
Interactions between employment size and indus t r y  a l s o  h a v e  a  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  o n  a l l  
industries.  The additional effect of employment size on privatized firms is negative in three 
out of four industries, the exception being construction, where we estimate a small positive 
coefficient.  Contrary to employment size, pre-privatization efficiency has a positive partial 
effect in all industries, both in SOEs and firms that underwent privatization.  Initial wages 
have a positive impact on employment growth in most industries in both SOEs and privatized 
firms, the sole exception being SOEs in construction.  The interaction of employment size and 
efficiency has a negative partial effect on SOEs’ employment growth, but the effect on 
privatized firms is positive.  This shows that ceteris paribus, large and already efficient firms 
grow further if they are privatized.  Employment-wage interactions have a positive estimated 
coefficient for SOEs and the effect is essentially zero for privatized firms (the coefficients with 
and without privatization interactions are very similar).  Finally, wage-efficiency interactions 
have a negative partial effect on both SOEs and privatized firms, but the effect is larger for 
the latter group.  If our assumptions hold about the information set of politicians, they 
believed that the employment effect of privatization is negatively correlated with initial 
employment size (unless firms were relatively efficient) and positively with efficiency and 
wages. 
The second column of the table shows the determinants of productivity growth.  The 
coefficients of industry-privatization interactions have a positive estimated coefficient in two 
out of four industries.  Employment size has a positive effect on productivity growth in all 
industries for SOEs, and this effect is always n e g a t i v e  f o r  t h e  p r i v a t i z e d  f i r m s ,  a s  t h e  
estimated coefficients of the three-way interactions between employment, industry and 
privatization are negative and larger in magnitude than the coefficients on employment- 
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industry interactions.  The initial levels of productivity and wages have negative effects in all 
industries, but the effects are smaller for privatized firms.  Employment-efficiency and wage-
efficiency interactions are very small, while the wage-efficiency interaction term has a 
positive effect on all firms, but the effect is very small for privatized firms.  To summarize, 
efficiency increase after privatization is expected to happen in small, already efficient firms 
that pay high wages, at least relative to SOEs. 
Finally, the change in wages during the analyzed period is negatively correlated with 
industry and other services in privatized firms, and positively in the other two industrial 
branches economy.  Initial employment size has a negative estimated coefficient in all 
industries for both SOEs and privatized firms, but the magnitudes are quite small.  Initial 
efficiency has a negative effect on wage growth when the company is owned by the state, and 
these effect is attenuated for privatized firms.  Initial wages also have negative partial effects 
on wage growth for all firms.  Interactions between employment, efficiency and wages have 
small estimated effects. 
The results of the simulation are shown in Table 4.  Under the assumptions made, 
politicians believed that privatization of all privatizable firms would have increased their 
employment by 5.5 percent.  On the contrary, the employment level of the non-privatizable 
firms would have decreased by 5.5 percent as a consequence of privatization.  The diverse 
privatization effect on employment is further underlined by the high statistical significance of 
the mean difference between the two groups.13 
Turning to the expected efficiency effect of privatization, our results show that this is 
p o s i t i v e  i n  b o t h  g r o u p s  o f  f i r m s ,  a n d  i t  i s  l a r g e r  f o r  t h e  n o n - p r i v a t i z a b l e  g r o u p .   T h e  
simulated efficiency increase for these firms is 43.7 percent, which is larger by five percentage 
points than the simulated effect in the privatizable group, and the difference is statistically 
highly significant.  This result is consistent with the findings of other authors (Dinc and 
Gupta, 2007; Gupta et al, 2008). 
The third outcome variable is the average wage.  The simulated effect of privatization on 
the growth rate of this variable is only 0.3 percent in both non-privatizable and privatizable 
firms.  To summarize, the simulations show that politicians were more concerned with the 
negative effect of privatization on employment than with efficiency improvement, and they 
protected labor even when they had to sacrifice productivity gains.  Wages do not seem to 
                                                        
13 The employment reduction of the non-privatizable firms may not seem very large, but it is not negligible.  The 
total employment of non-privatizable firms was over one million in 1992.  If we apply the expected employment 
effect of privatization on the whole group, the number of jobs lost would have been 56,000, or about eight percent 
of the number of registered unemployed in 1996 (Romanian Statistical Yearbook, 1997, p. 148).  
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play an important role in the selection of firms into privatization programs, which is at odds 
with earlier findings (Dinc and Gupta, 2007; Liu et al, 2007).14 
To test the robustness of our results, we replace labor productivity with return on assets 
(ROA).15  The results (not presented) show similar patterns to those presented above.  If 
efficiency is measured by ROA, the simulated employment loss of non-privatizable firms 
increases to 7.9 percent, while the effect does not change for the privatizable group.  The 
expected efficiency effects of privatization are very similar for the two groups, but the effect is 
slightly larger for the non-privatizable group.  The simulated wage effect of privatization 
increased for the non-privatizable group, and the mean difference between the non-
privatizable and privatizable groups is significantly different from zero.  Nonetheless, the 
simulated wage effect of privatization is still very small.  The difference of the simulated effect 
of privatization between non-privatizable and privatizable firms is shown in the first row of 
Table 5, where we also present this statistic for several other robustness checks.  To allow for 
more flexibility in the first stage regression, we include squared employment, efficiency and 
wages both in levels and in the privatization interactions.  We also test whether changes in 
the sample affect the results.  First, we excluded firms that were under the subordination of 
the ministries and therefore their status regarding privatizability is unclear, as discussed in 
Section 3.2.  We dropped those firms that were privatized already in 1992 and thus the first 
year of the study might be contaminated by privatization effects.  We added back firms to the 
sample which were removed because they were outliers in productivity or wages.  Very small 
and very large firms were also added back.  Finally, we added back outliers and the firms that 
were excluded because of size restrictions, and did the same analysis.  As Table 5 shows, the 
results do not change qualitatively:  the expected employment effect is always smaller for the 
non-privatizable firms than for the privatizable ones, while the efficiency and wage effects are 
similar.16  These robustness checks actually provide larger differences in the simulated effect 
of privatization on employment than our base results, while efficiency and wage effects are 
very similar to those presented in Table 4. 
One possibility we have not studied so far is that the results are driven by selection of 
firms by the future private owners.  It is likely that they picked firms with better prospects 
and thus privatized firms are different from privatizable, but not privatized firms.  We have 
controlled for initial characteristics, so the bias has to arise through some omitted variable, 
                                                        
14 It is likely that politicians were more concerned about job losses than wage declines as between 1992 and 1996 
the number of employed persons fell by ten percent (from 10,458 thousand to 9,379 thousand), while average real 
wages did not change (Romanian Statistical Yearbook, 1997, p. 125 and 176). 
15 Corporate taxes, and therefore government revenues are tied to profits, so it is possible that politicians had 
profits and other measures of productivity in their utility function.  Profits, however, are not a reliable variable, 
especially in early transition and for this reason our preferred variable is labor productivity.  We prefer labor 
productivity also because profits are missing in a larger number of firms than labor productivity. 
16 In all these robustness checks the employment effect on non-privatized firms is always negative, and smaller 




for example the growth potential of the firm or the quality of labor not captured by higher 
average wages.  For example, as most of the new owners in the privatized firms in Romania 
are the employees of the firm, it is possible that they bought up those firms for which 
maintaining the employment level was easy.  In this case the difference in the simulated 
privatization effects may not arise between the privatizable and not-privatizable firms, but 
between the privatized and not privatized ones.  We check for such possibilities by 
disaggregating the privatizable group into not privatized and privatized firms and redo the 
simulation for all three groups (non-privatizable, privatizable, but not privatized and 
privatized).  The results, shown in Table 6, are similar to those in Table 4.  The simulated 
privatization effects of the two privatizable groups are always employment enhancing and the 
efficiency effects always smaller than the effect measured for the non-privatizable group.  The 
expected effects of two privatizable groups are very similar in terms of efficiency 
enhancement and wage growth, but privatized firms’ employment effect is larger than that of 
the privatizable but not yet privatized group’s. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Privatization has been one of the most important policies that shaped the economies of many 
countries in the last three decades.  In this paper we analyze the prerequisite for 
privatization, the political selection of firms into privatization programs.  We take advantage 
of comprehensive data and the fact that a group of state-owned firms was explicitly banned 
from privatization in Romania.  We use simulation methods to estimate the expected 
employment, efficiency and wage effects of privatization on the sorting of firms into 
privatization programs and find that employment concerns were of primary importance, even 
if efficiency gains had to be sacrificed.  The expected employment effect of privatization is 
negative and 5.2 percent on average for the non-privatizable group, and it is positive and has 
the same magnitude for the privatizable group.  Efficiency increase, on the other hand, is 
higher for the non-privatizable group:  according to the simulations, politicians expected 
privatization to enhance efficiency by 44 percent for the non-privatizable group and by 39 
percent if all the privatizable firms’ assets had been transferred to private hands.  Wages do 
not seem to have played a role in the political selection of firms into the privatization 
program, as the simulated effects are small in both groups of firms.  These results are robust 
to a different specification in the first step regression, to the use of different measures of firm 
efficiency, and to different samples of firms. 
While our results are very robust, several factors may weaken them, which we list below.  
The crucial assumption in the simulation is that firms that have not become private would 
have behaved in the same way as privatized firms, had they been privatized.  This is a  
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common problem in any simulation, and we tried to mitigate it by augmenting the 
regression with different cross-terms to control for observable characteristics as well as 
possible.  Nevertheless, we cannot be sure that unmeasured characteristics of firms in the 
privatizable and non-privatizable groups are similar.  When we disaggregate the privatizable 
group into privatized and not privatized, the main results hold, which provides some 
evidence that this bias is probably not very large, at least it does not affect qualitatively the 
analysis of political selection of firms into privatization programs.  We should also emphasize 
that our goal is not to measure the effects of privatization, but to estimate this effect using the 
information set available to the decision makers.  If they possessed the same information that 
we use, our results hold regardless of differences in unobserved characteristics of non-
privatizable and privatizable firms. 
Second, the privatizations are mainly MEBOs, and it is questionable how the 
results can be applied to other privatization methods, such as direct sales.  It is 
indeed likely that firm behavior under the control of the management and employees 
is different from outsider ownership.  In particular, it is possible that the employee-
owners would sacrifice efficiency increase if it caused employment reduction, while 
this behavior is less likely to happen in an outside-owned enterprise.  On the other 
hand, larger efficiency increase, as well as more entrepreneurial owners may increase 
employment through the scale effect and extension to new markets.  Therefore, it is 
unclear a priori what the effects of privatization are in the case of sales to outside 
owners and how they relate to MEBO privatizations.17  But if decision makers foresaw 
that privatizations will mostly be MEBOs, our results hold and there is some evidence 
that the Romanian program was prepared to be mostly MEBO, at least in the early 
phase.  In a pilot privatization program launched in 1992, out of the 22 companies 
finally privatized, 15 were exclusively and 4 partially MEBOs (Earle and Telegdy, 
1998).  Nevertheless, we cannot be sure that decision makers knew this already in 
1990, when they selected firms into privatization programs. 
Finally, we do not control for unobservable firm-specific effects in the first-stage 
regressions, and thus the estimated coefficients, which we use to simulate the effect 
of privatization, may be biased.  We cannot rule this possibility out, but our interest is 
not estimating the privatization effect per se, but to try to use that information that 
was available to the decision makers.  We argue that it is unlikely that they possessed 
                                                        
17 Earle and Telegdy (2002) find that the Romanian MEBO privatization enhanced the productivity of the firms 
compared to state ownership, but the effect is smaller than of outsider privatization.  Frydman et al. (1999) 
conclude that insider privatization does not enhance productivity, while outside privatization does, and there is 
only weak evidence that the employment levels are different at the firms under the two ownership structures.  
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a great deal of insider information on the large number of firms under state 
ownership at the beginning of the transition.  Ideally we should use the information 
set that was available to the decision makers when they were deciding about the 
privatizability of firms.  We do not know what this information set was, but we think 
the most important variables that can be taken from the firm’s books are the best 
candidates. 
The analysis is in line with previous research and provides further evidence that 
privatization is a political process and that efficiency enhancement is only one of the factors 
which influence the decisions of politicians when they select firms into privatization 
programs.  In Romania, where jobs were destroyed and employment fell in the whole 
country, politicians sensed the large political costs of further job destruction; their main 
concern was not the efficiency enhancement of firms but the preservation of employment at 
any price. 





  Non-Privatizable and Privatizable Firm Characteristics in 1992 
 
   Non-privatizable  Privatizable  Mean difference 
Employment 1,402  457  946*** 
 (288.9)  (17.9)  (101.6) 
Labor productivity  2,092  4,064  -1,971* 
 (318.3)  (282.9)  (1,118.8) 
Wage 290  303  -13 
 (10.8)  (3.3)  (13.2) 
Return on Assets  0.017  0.047  -0.030*** 
 (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.009) 
Industry     Percent non-
privatizable 
Manufacturing 7 255  2.7 
Energy 51  28  64.6 
Water distribution  49  13  79.0 
Construction 7  524  1.3 
Transportation 25  506  4.7 
Utilities 11  12  47.8 
Other services  19  1,290  1.5 
Total 169  2,628  6.0 
Notes:  return on assets is missing for 26 non-privatizable and 460 privatizable firms.  Mean difference 
represents the difference between the average value of non-privatizable and privatizable firms.  Labor 
productivity, wages and return on assets are measured in thousands of 1992 Lei.  NACE codes included in 
industries:  manufacturing (22, 24, 36); energy (40); water distribution (41); construction (45), transportation 
(60, 63, 64); utilities (90); other services (51, 52, 55, 70, 73, 74, 92).  *** = significant at the 1-percent level; * 





Table 2  
 
Selection of Firms into 
 Privatization Programs 
 
Variable Coefficient 
Employment 92  -0.014*** 
 (0.003) 
Efficiency 92  0.010** 
 (0.004) 






Other services  0.093*** 
 (0.012) 
Mean privatizable  0.940 
Notes:  N = 2,797.  Probit estimates, the coefficients show 
marginal effects (robust standard errors in parenthesis).   
Dependent variable = 1 if the firm is privatizable, = 0 if 
not.  Excluded industrial dummy: industry.  *** = 






 Effect of Pre-Privatization Characteristics on  
Employment, Productivity and Wage Growth 
 






Industry*PO -6.979  0.985  -0.081 
 (6.831)  (5.367)  (0.411) 
Construction*PO -7.268  0.658  0.133 
 (7.056)  (5.629)  (0.492) 
Transportation*PO -8.959  -1.712  0.325 
 (6.804)  (5.242)  (0.472) 
Other services*PO  -4.822  -1.515  -0.103 
 (7.596)  (5.381)  (0.492) 
Employment*Industry -0.165  0.243  -0.036 
 (0.345)  (0.391)  (0.024) 
Employment* Industry *PO  -0.070  -0.740  -0.055 
 (0.738)  (0.666)  (0.049) 
Employment*Construction -0.223  0.249  -0.035 
 (0.345)  (0.394)  (0.024) 
Employment* Construction *PO  0.034  -0.571  -0.042 
 (0.754)  (0.680)  (0.051) 
Employment* Transportation  -0.165  0.226  -0.026 
 (0.349)  (0.389)  (0.024) 
Employment* Transportation *PO  -0.106  -0.553  -0.051 
 (0.758)  (0.669)  (0.050) 
Employment* Otherserv.  -0.184  0.193  -0.031 
 (0.341)  (0.386)  (0.024) 
Employment* Otherserv.*PO  -0.196  -0.575  -0.044 
 (0.747)  (0.667)  (0.049) 
Efficiency* Industry  0.920**  -0.774**  -0.074*** 
 (0.359)  (0.364)  (0.023) 
Efficiency* Industry *PO  0.422  0.215  0.020 
 (0.730)  (0.547)  (0.049) 
Efficiency* Construction  1.026***  -0.929**  -0.087*** 
 (0.358)  (0.364)  (0.023) 
Efficiency* Construction *PO  0.510  0.438  0.022 
 (0.753)  (0.558)  (0.053) 
Efficiency* Transportation  0.794**  -0.894***  -0.088*** 
 (0.357)  (0.346)  (0.023) 
Efficiency* Transportation *PO  0.684  0.603  0.045 
 (0.738)  (0.538)  (0.049) 
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Efficiency* Otherserv.  0.623*  -0.819**  -0.110*** 
 (0.343)  (0.342)  (0.022) 
Efficiency* Otherserv.*PO  0.675  0.508  0.048 
 (0.721)  (0.521)  (0.048) 
Wage* Industry  0.186  -0.387  -0.238*** 
 (0.403)  (0.455)  (0.025) 
Wage* Industry *PO  1.308  0.418  0.031 
 (0.813)  (0.670)  (0.049) 
Wage* Construction  -0.058  -0.615  -0.236*** 
 (0.374)  (0.431)  (0.025) 
Wage* Construction *PO  1.199  0.117  -0.008 
 (0.854)  (0.717)  (0.062) 
Wage*Transportation 0.623*  -0.491  -0.225*** 
 (0.356)  (0.390)  (0.024) 
Wage* Transportation *PO  1.323  0.273  -0.044 
 (0.869)  (0.694)  (0.059) 
Wage* Otherserv.  0.908**  -0.920**  -0.206*** 
 (0.365)  (0.414)  (0.024) 
Wage*Otherserv.*PO 0.902  0.346  0.000 
 (0.890)  (0.670)  (0.058) 
Employment*Efficiency -0.025*  -0.016  -0.004*** 
 (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.001) 
Employment*Efficiency*PO 0.059**  0.020  -0.001 
 (0.030)  (0.033)  (0.002) 
Employment*Wage 0.041  -0.009  0.007** 
 (0.044)  (0.051)  (0.003) 
Employment*Wage*PO -0.051  0.054  0.007 
 (0.092)  (0.085)  (0.007) 
Wage*Efficiency -0.058  0.083**  0.015*** 
 (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.002) 
Wage*Efficiency*PO -0.108  -0.078  -0.004 
 (0.081)  (0.059)  (0.005) 
R
2 0.159 0.324 0.304 
Note:  N = 2,797.  The regression includes industry controls.  NACE codes included in industrial dummies: industry:  22, 
24, 36, 40, 41; construction: 45; transportation: 60, 63, 64; other services: 51, 52, 55, , 70, 73, 74, 90, 92.  Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  *** = significant at the 1-percent level, ** = significant at the 5-percent level; * = significant at the 
10-percent level. 




  Simulated Effect of Privatization on  









-0.052 0.052  -0.104*** 
(0.016) (0.004) (0.015) 
Efficiency 
0.437 0.387 0.050*** 
(0.017) (0.003)  (0.013) 
Wage 
0.003 0.003 0.000 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Note:  N = 169 for non-privatizable, 2,628 for privatizable 
firms.  The table presents the average simulated effect of 
privatization (the hypothetical percentage change of the 
variable) for non-privatizable and privatizable firms.  Mean 
difference = difference in the hypothetical privatization 
effect between non-privatizable and privatizable firms.   







  Robustness Checks 
 
  Mean difference in privatization effect  Number of firms 
 Employment  Efficiency Wage  Non-
privatizable 
Privatizable 
-0.134*** 0.006  0.009***  Efficiency measured by ROA. 
(0.019) (0.004) (0.001) 
143 2,168 
-0.114*** 0.047***  0.002*  Emp2, Eff2 and Wage2 added 
to first stage regression.  (0.016) (0.014)    (0.000) 
169 2,628 
-0.140*** 0.031*** 0.000  Firms with unclear 
privatization status taken out.  (0.018) (0.010) (0.001) 
169 2,423 
-0.101*** 0.067***  0.001  Firms privatized in 1992 
taken out.  (0.015) (0.012) (0.001) 
169 2,616 
-0.123*** 0.073***  -0.001  Outliers added. 
(0.020) (0.012) (0.001) 
170 2,459 
-0.141*** 0.031*** 0.000  Very small and very large 
firms added.  (0.018) (0.009) (0.001) 
171 2,468 
-0.096*** 0.090*** 0.001  All sample. 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.001) 
173 2,794 
Note: The table presents the mean difference of the simulated privatization effect between non-privatizable and privatizable firms 





  Simulated Effect of Privatization for Non-privatizable,  














(1) – (2) 
Mean 
Difference  
(1) – (3) 
Employment 
-0.052 0.030 0.115 -0.082***  -0.167*** 
(0.016) (0.004) (0.006) (0.016) (0.015) 
Efficiency 
0.437 0.398 0.353  0.038***  0.083*** 
(0.017) (0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.017) 
Wages 
0.003 0.003 0.003  0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Note:  N = 169 for non-privatizable, 1,945 for privatizable but not privatized and 683 for 
privatized firms.  The table presents the average simulated effect of privatization (the 
hypothetical percentage change of the variable) for non-privatizable, privatizable and not 
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